In this article, we develop an interdisciplinary analysis of MEV which desires to merge the gap that exists between technical and legal research supporting policymakers in their regulatory decisions concerning blockchains, DeFi and associated risks. Consequently, this article is intended for both technical and legal audiences, and while we abstain from a detailed legal analysis, we aim to open a policy discussion regarding decentralized governance design at the block building layer as the place where MEV occurs. Maximal Extractable Value or MEV has been one of the major concerns in blockchain designs as it creates a centralizing force which ultimately affects user transactions. In this article, we dive into the technicality behind MEV, where we explain the concept behind the novel Proposal Builder Separation design as an effort by Flashbots to increase decentralization through modularity. We underline potential vulnerability factors under the PBS design, which open space for MEV extracting adversarial strategies by inside participants. We discuss the shift of trust from validators to builders in PoS blockchains such as Ethereum, acknowledging the impact that the later ones may have on users' transactions (in terms of front running) and censorship resistance (in terms of transaction inclusion). We recognize that under PBS, centralized (dominant) entities such as builders could potentially harm users by extracting MEV via front running strategies. Finally, we suggest adequate design and policy measures which could potentially mitigate these negative effects while protecting blockchain users.
翻译:本文对MEV进行了跨学科分析,旨在弥合区块链、DeFi及相关风险监管决策中技术与法律研究之间的鸿沟。因此,本文面向技术与法律双领域读者,虽不展开详细法律分析,但旨在开启关于区块构建层(MEV发生场所)去中心化治理设计的政策讨论。最大可提取价值(MEV)一直是区块链设计中的核心关切,因其形成的中心化力量最终影响用户交易。本文深入MEV技术细节,阐释了Flashbots为通过模块化提升去中心化而提出的新型提案者-构建者分离设计(PBS)背后的原理。我们重点剖析了PBS设计下潜在脆弱性因素——这些因素为内部参与者采用MEV提取对抗策略提供了空间。本文探讨了以太坊等PoS区块链中信任从验证者向构建者的转移,承认后者可能通过抢先交易影响用户交易,并通过交易包含机制影响抗审查能力。我们认识到,在PBS框架下,中心化主导实体(如构建者)可能通过抢先交易策略提取MEV从而损害用户利益。最后,我们提出潜在的设计与政策措施,在保护区块链用户的同时缓解这些负面影响。