Utilities and transmission system operators (TSO) around the world implement demand response programs for reducing electricity consumption by sending information on the state of balance between supply demand to end-use consumers. We construct a Bayesian persuasion model to analyse such demand response programs. Using a simple model consisting of two time steps for contract signing and invoking, we analyse the relation between the pricing of electricity and the incentives of the TSO to garble information about the true state of the generation. We show that if the electricity is priced at its marginal cost of production, the TSO has no incentive to lie and always tells the truth. On the other hand, we provide conditions where overpricing of electricity leads the TSO to provide no information to the consumer.

翻译：全球范围内的公用事业公司和输电系统运营商通过向终端用户发送供需平衡状态信息来实施需求响应项目，以减少电力消耗。我们构建了一个贝叶斯说服模型来分析此类需求响应项目。通过一个包含合同签订和触发两个时间步的简单模型，我们分析了电价与输电系统运营商在发电真实状态信息传递中失真动机之间的关系。研究表明，若电价按边际生产成本定价，输电系统运营商没有说谎动机，始终传递真实信息。另一方面，我们给出了电价过高导致输电系统运营商完全不向消费者提供信息的相关条件。