With the rise of location-based service (LBS) applications that rely on terrestrial and satellite infrastructures (e.g., GNSS and crowd-sourced Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, and IP databases) for positioning, ensuring their integrity and security is paramount. However, we demonstrate that these applications are susceptible to low-cost attacks (less than $50), including Wi-Fi spoofing combined with GNSS jamming, as well as more sophisticated coordinated location spoofing. These attacks manipulate position data to control or undermine LBS functionality, leading to user scams or service manipulation. Therefore, we propose a countermeasure to detect and thwart such attacks by utilizing readily available, redundant positioning information from off-the-shelf platforms. Our method extends the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) framework by incorporating opportunistic information, including data from onboard sensors and terrestrial infrastructure signals, and, naturally, GNSS. We theoretically show that the fusion of heterogeneous signals improves resilience against sophisticated adversaries on multiple fronts. Experimental evaluations show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in improving detection accuracy by 62% at most compared to baseline schemes and restoring accurate positioning.

翻译：随着依赖地面与卫星基础设施（如全球导航卫星系统、众包Wi-Fi、蓝牙、蜂窝网络及IP数据库）进行定位的基于位置服务应用日益普及，确保其完整性与安全性至关重要。然而，本文揭示此类应用易受低成本攻击（低于50美元）影响，包括Wi-Fi欺骗结合全球导航卫星系统干扰，以及更复杂的协同位置伪造攻击。这些攻击通过篡改位置数据以操控或破坏基于位置服务的功能，导致用户受骗或服务被操纵。为此，我们提出一种利用现成平台中易于获取的冗余定位信息来检测并抵御此类攻击的防御对策。该方法通过融合机会性信息（包括来自板载传感器、地面基础设施信号及全球导航卫星系统的数据），扩展了接收机自主完好性监测框架。我们从理论上证明，异构信号的融合能在多个层面提升对复杂攻击的抵御能力。实验评估表明，所提方案相比基线方法最高可提升62%的检测准确率，并能恢复精确的定位能力。