A fundamental question asked in modal logic is whether a given theory is consistent. But consistent with what? A typical way to address this question identifies a choice of background knowledge axioms (say, S4, D, etc.) and then shows the assumptions codified by the theory in question to be consistent with those background axioms. But determining the specific choice and division of background axioms is, at least sometimes, little more than tradition. This paper introduces **generic theories** for propositional modal logic to address consistency results in a more robust way. As building blocks for background knowledge, generic theories provide a standard for categorical determinations of consistency. We argue that the results and methods of this paper help to elucidate problems in epistemology and enjoy sufficient scope and power to have purchase on problems bearing on modalities in judgement, inference, and decision making.

翻译：模态逻辑中的一个基本问题是给定理论是否一致。但一致于什么？回答这一问题的典型方法是确定一组背景知识公理（例如，S4、D 等），然后证明所讨论理论所编码的假设与这些背景公理一致。然而，确定背景公理的具体选择和划分至少在某些情况下仅仅是基于传统。本文引入命题模态逻辑的**泛型理论**，以更强健的方式处理一致性结果。作为背景知识的构建模块，泛型理论为类别性判定一致性提供了标准。我们论证本文的结果和方法有助于阐明认识论中的问题，并具有足够的广度和效力，能够解决涉及判断、推理和决策中模态的相关问题。