Motivated by online platforms such as job markets, we study an agent choosing from a list of candidates, each with a hidden quality that determines match value. The agent observes only a noisy ranking of the candidates plus a binary signal that indicates whether each candidate is "free" or "busy." Being busy is positively correlated with higher quality, but can also reduce value due to decreased availability. We study the agent's optimal selection problem in the presence of ranking noise and free-busy signals and ask how the accuracy of the ranking tool impacts outcomes. In a setting with one high-valued candidate and an arbitrary number of low-valued candidates, we show that increased accuracy of the ranking tool can result in reduced social welfare. This can occur for two reasons: agents may be more likely to make offers to busy candidates, and (paradoxically) may be more likely to select lower-ranked candidates when rankings are more indicative of quality. We further discuss conditions under which these results extend to more general settings.

翻译：受在线平台（如就业市场）的启发，我们研究一个代理从候选列表中做出选择的问题，每个候选者具有决定匹配价值的隐藏质量。代理仅能观测到候选者的噪声排名以及一个二元信号，该信号指示每个候选者处于“空闲”或“忙碌”状态。忙碌状态与更高质量正相关，但也可能因可用性降低而减少价值。我们研究了在排名噪声和空闲-忙碌信号存在下代理的最优选择问题，并探讨排名工具的准确性如何影响结果。在包含一个高价值候选者和任意数量低价值候选者的设定中，我们发现排名工具准确性的提高可能导致社会福利降低。这可能由两个原因造成：代理可能更倾向于向忙碌候选者发出邀约，并且（矛盾地）当排名更能反映质量时，代理可能更可能选择排名较低的候选者。我们进一步讨论了这些结果在更一般设定中成立的条件。