As advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) propel progress in the life sciences, they may also enable the weaponisation and misuse of biological agents. This article differentiates two classes of AI tools that could pose such biosecurity risks: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). LLMs, such as GPT-4 and its successors, might provide dual-use information and thus remove some barriers encountered by historical biological weapons efforts. As LLMs are turned into multi-modal lab assistants and autonomous science tools, this will increase their ability to support non-experts in performing laboratory work. Thus, LLMs may in particular lower barriers to biological misuse. In contrast, BDTs will expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors. Concretely, BDTs may enable the creation of pandemic pathogens substantially worse than anything seen to date and could enable forms of more predictable and targeted biological weapons. In combination, the convergence of LLMs and BDTs could raise the ceiling of harm from biological agents and could make them broadly accessible. A range of interventions would help to manage risks. Independent pre-release evaluations could help understand the capabilities of models and the effectiveness of safeguards. Options for differentiated access to such tools should be carefully weighed with the benefits of openly releasing systems. Lastly, essential for mitigating risks will be universal and enhanced screening of gene synthesis products.

翻译：随着人工智能（AI）的进步推动生命科学发展，它也可能导致生物制剂的武器化与滥用。本文区分了两类可能构成此类生物安全风险的AI工具：大型语言模型（LLMs）与生物设计工具（BDTs）。LLMs（如GPT-4及其后继者）可能提供双重用途信息，从而消除历史上生物武器计划所面临的部分障碍。当LLMs转变为多模态实验室助手和自主科学工具时，它们将进一步提升辅助非专家进行实验室工作的能力。因此，LLMs尤其可能降低生物滥用的门槛。相比之下，BDTs将扩展复杂行为者的能力范围。具体而言，BDTs可能促成创造比以往所见严重得多的流行病原体，并可能催生更具可预测性和靶向性的生物武器形式。两者结合时，LLMs与BDTs的融合可能提升生物制剂的危害上限，并使其广泛可及。一系列干预措施有助于管理风险。独立发布前评估可帮助理解模型能力及防护措施的有效性。应谨慎权衡这些工具差异化访问选项与系统开放发布带来的益处。最后，减轻风险的关键在于对基因合成产品实施普遍且加强的筛查。