We introduce a game model called "customer attraction game" to demonstrate the competition among online content providers. In this model, customers exhibit interest in various topics. Each content provider selects one topic and benefits from the attracted customers. We investigate both symmetric and asymmetric settings involving agents and customers. In the symmetric setting, the existence of pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is guaranteed, but finding a PNE is PLS-complete. To address this, we propose a fully polynomial time approximation scheme to identify an approximate PNE. Moreover, the tight Price of Anarchy (PoA) is established. In the asymmetric setting, we show the nonexistence of PNE in certain instances and establish that determining its existence is NP-hard. Nevertheless, we prove the existence of an approximate PNE. Additionally, when agents select topics sequentially, we demonstrate that finding a subgame-perfect equilibrium is PSPACE-hard. Furthermore, we present the sequential PoA for the two-agent setting.

翻译：我们提出了一种称为“客户吸引博弈”的博弈模型，以展示在线内容提供商之间的竞争。在该模型中，客户对各类主题表现出兴趣。每个内容提供商选择一个主题，并从吸引到的客户中获益。我们研究了涉及代理与客户的对称与非对称设定。在对称设定中，纯纳什均衡（PNE）的存在性得到保证，但寻找PNE是PLS完全的。为解决这一问题，我们提出了一种全多项式时间近似方案来识别近似PNE。此外，还确定了严格的无序代价（PoA）界限。在非对称设定中，我们证明了某些实例中PNE不存在，并判定其存在性是NP难的。尽管如此，我们证明了近似PNE的存在性。此外，当代理顺序选择主题时，我们证明寻找子博弈完美均衡是PSPACE难的。进一步地，我们给出了两个代理设定下的序贯PoA。