Cyber-capable AI agents combine language models with tools, memory, and execution en- vironments to perform multi-step offensive-security tasks. Existing work separately measures cyber capability and catalogs attacks against agent components, but provides less guidance on containing a capable agent within the environments used to evaluate it. This review synthe- sizes five vulnerability classes at that boundary: multi-step offensive chains, objectives that conflict with sandbox boundaries, supply-chain and credential exposure, persistent command- and-control, and the speed of automated action. We use the reported July 2026 Hugging Face/OpenAI incident as a bounded case study, distinguishing incident-specific observations from findings established in the wider literature. Across the taxonomy and case, we examine controls for containment, privilege separation, provenance, and responder access, including the dual-use problem that defensive artifacts may also enable misuse. The review identifies practical priorities for evaluating cyber capability together with the security of the environment in which that capability is exercised.

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