We study strategyproof mechanisms for building a pathway between two regions of a line segment separated by an obstacle. Each of the $n$ agents has a private location within its region and may use either its original route to a facility or the new pathway, whose traversal cost is a fraction $k\in[0,1)$ of its length. We seek strategyproof (SP) and group-strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms that approximately minimize maximum cost or social cost. After characterizing optimal pathways for both objectives, we establish a tight deterministic maximum-cost approximation ratio of $\frac{2}{1+k}$ and a deterministic social-cost upper bound of $\frac{n}{1+k(n-1)}$, together with complementary lower bounds. Both upper bounds are achieved by GSP mechanisms. We then study randomized mechanisms under strategyproofness in expectation. A power-proportional mechanism achieves a social-cost approximation ratio at most $5$, independent of $n$ and $k$, with a tight guarantee of $3$ for this mechanism when $k=0$. We prove randomized lower bounds of $\frac{3+2k}{2+3k}$ for maximum cost and $\max\big\{1,\frac{285}{263+385k}\big\}$ for social cost, the latter for $n\ge7$. Finally, we improve several bounds for the real-line pathway model of [Chan and Wang, AAMAS 2023]. Our deterministic maximum-cost lower bound of $2$ matches the upper bound obtainable from [Qin, Fang, and Liu, COCOA 2024]. We strengthen the deterministic social-cost lower bound from $\frac32$ to $2$ under SP and to $\max\{2,n-1\}$ under GSP. For randomized social cost, we sharpen the guarantee of Chan and Wang's proportional mechanism from $6$ to $3$ and raise their lower bound from $1.02$ to $\frac{285}{263}\approx1.08365$ for $n\ge7$.

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