We argue that transaction ordering techniques for capturing Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in blockchains where fees can influence the execution sequence do not directly apply to blockchains where execution order is determined based on transactions' arrival times. The First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) nature of such blockchains can yield different optimization strategies for MEV searchers, requiring further study. This paper explores the applicability of MEV extraction techniques from fee-based blockchains on an FCFS blockchain such as Algorand. Our results reveal similarities to recent trends on fee-based blockchains like Ethereum, with most arbitrages occurring through backruns on pending transactions in the network. However, we attribute the outcomes to different underlying reasons. While we do not observe any latency optimizations between specific searchers and block proposers, we discuss that this is due to searchers adopting similar strategies and Algorand's relay-based network infrastructure. We finally propose a novel strategy for searchers through Batch Transaction Issuance, leading the network to congestion and enabling frontrunning-based ordering techniques.

翻译：我们认为，在交易费用可影响执行顺序的区块链中，用于捕获最大提取价值（MEV）的交易排序技术并不直接适用于执行顺序由交易到达时间决定的区块链。此类区块链的先到先服务（FCFS）特性可能为MEV搜索者带来不同的优化策略，需要进一步研究。本文探讨了基于费用的区块链中的MEV提取技术在Algorand等FCFS区块链上的适用性。我们的结果揭示了与以太坊等基于费用的区块链近期趋势的相似性，大多数套利通过网络中待处理交易的后运行（backrun）实现。然而，我们将这些结果归因于不同的底层原因。虽然我们未观察到特定搜索者与区块提议者之间的延迟优化，但我们指出这是由于搜索者采用相似策略以及Algorand基于中继的网络基础设施所致。最后，我们为搜索者提出了一种新颖策略——批量交易发布（Batch Transaction Issuance），该策略会导致网络拥塞并支持基于前运行（frontrunning）的排序技术。