As quantum computing advances, the cryptographic algorithms that underpin confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) face increasing vulnerability to quantum-enabled attacks. To address these risks, governments and industry stakeholders are turning toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a class of algorithms designed to resist adversaries equipped with quantum computing capabilities. However, existing studies provide limited insight into the implementation-focused aspects of PQC in the ITS domain. This review fills that gap by evaluating the readiness of vehicular communication and security standards for PQC adoption. It examines in-vehicle networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interfaces, while also investigating vulnerabilities at the physical layer, primarily exposure to side-channel and fault injection attacks. The review identifies thirteen research gaps reflecting non-PQC-ready standards, constraints in embedded implementation and hybrid cryptography, interoperability and certificate-management barriers, lack of real-world PQC deployment data in ITS, and physical-attack vulnerabilities in PQC-enabled vehicular communication. Future research directions include updating vehicular communication and security standards, optimizing PQC for low-power devices, enhancing interoperability and certificate-management frameworks for PQC integration, conducting real-world evaluations of PQC-enabled communication and control functions across ITS deployments, and strengthening defenses against AI-assisted physical attacks. A phased roadmap is presented, aligning PQC deployment with regulatory, performance, and safety requirements, thereby guiding the secure evolution of ITS in the quantum computing era.

翻译：随着量子计算的发展，支撑智能交通系统（ITS）中机密性、完整性和认证的密码算法面临日益增长的量子攻击威胁。为应对这些风险，各国政府及行业相关方正转向后量子密码学（PQC）——一类旨在抵御具备量子计算能力的攻击者的算法。然而，现有研究对PQC在ITS领域面向实施的层面提供有限洞见。本综述通过评估车载通信与安全标准对PQC采用的准备度来填补这一空白。文章检视了车内网络与车联万物（V2X）接口，同时探究了物理层的脆弱性，主要针对侧信道攻击与故障注入攻击的暴露风险。本综述识别出十三个研究缺口，反映了现有标准未适配PQC、嵌入式实施与混合密码学的限制、互操作性及证书管理障碍、ITS中缺乏真实世界PQC部署数据，以及启用PQC的车载通信面临的物理攻击脆弱性。未来研究方向包括：更新车载通信与安全标准、为低功耗设备优化PQC、增强PQC集成的互操作性及证书管理框架、在ITS部署中对启用PQC的通信与控制功能开展真实世界评估，以及强化针对AI辅助物理攻击的防御能力。本文提出了分阶段路线图，使PQC部署与监管、性能及安全要求相协调，从而指引量子计算时代下ITS的安全演进。