We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security absence of malicious attacks. We consider ten model-based formalisms, comparing their modeling principles, the interaction between safety and security, and analysis methods. In each formalism, we model the classical Locked Door Example where possible. Our key finding is that the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood. Existing formalisms merge previous safety and security formalisms, without introducing specific constructs to model safety-security interactions, or metrics to analyze trade offs.

翻译：我们调查了基于模式的安全和安保分析形式主义最新技术,其中安全是指没有意外失败,安全是指没有恶意袭击。我们考虑了10种基于模式的形式主义,比较了模式原则、安全与安保之间的相互作用以及分析方法。在每一种形式主义中,我们尽可能地模拟典型的封闭门实例。我们的主要发现是,安全保障互动的确切性质仍然不为人所知。现有的形式主义融合了以往的安全和安保形式主义,没有引入安全安保互动模式的具体构思,也没有引入分析交易的衡量标准。