Federated Byzantine Agreement Systems (FBASs) offer a solution to consensus in permissionless systems by adapting the well-studied Byzantine agreement model to permissionless consensus. Unlike its counterparts in the context of permissionless consensus, the FBAS system model does not offer validating nodes protocol-level incentives although they are entrusted with safeguarding and ensuring the functionality of the system. Multiple studies have reported on the small number of active validators in these systems leading to some concerns about their resilience. To this end, this paper studies how rewards can be distributed in FBASs and presents a fair reward distribution function for FBASs. The challenge is that, on the one hand, consensus in an FBAS is found jointly between all nodes and, on the other hand, nodes do not all contribute equally to this process. We draw on game-theoretic methods to quantify these contributions bearing the overall health of the FBAS in mind and present a fair reward distribution function which we evaluate based on a set of identified properties.

翻译：联邦拜占庭协议系统（FBASs）通过将经过充分研究的拜占庭协议模型适配到无需许可的共识场景中，为无许可系统提供了共识解决方案。与无许可共识领域的其他方案不同，FBAS系统模型未向验证节点提供协议层面的激励，尽管这些节点被委以保障系统安全与功能运行的重任。多项研究指出该类系统中活跃验证节点数量有限，引发对其鲁棒性的担忧。为此，本文研究了FBASs中的奖励分配机制，并提出了一种适用于FBASs的公平奖励分配函数。该问题的挑战在于：一方面FBAS共识由所有节点共同达成，另一方面各节点对此过程的贡献并不均等。我们借助博弈论方法，在兼顾FBAS整体健康度的前提下量化节点贡献，提出了基于一组既定属性评估的公平奖励分配函数。