It is unclear how to restructure ownership when an asset is privately held, and there is uncertainty about the owners' subjective valuations. When ownership is divided equally between two owners, a commonly used mechanism is called a BMBY mechanism. This mechanism works as follows: each owner can initiate a BMBY by naming her price. Once an owner declares a price, the other chooses to sell his holdings or buy the shares of the initiator at the given price. This mechanism is simple and tractable; however, it does not elicit actual owner valuations, does not guarantee an efficient allocation, and, most importantly, is limited to an equal partnership of two owners. In this paper, we extend this rationale to a multi-owner setting. Our proposed mechanism elicits owner valuations truthfully. Additionally, our proposed mechanism exhibits several desirable traits: it is easy to implement, budget balanced, robust to collusion (weakly group strategyproof), individually rational, and ex-post efficient.

翻译：当资产为私人持有且所有者主观估值存在不确定性时，如何重组所有权尚不明确。当所有权由两位所有者平均持有时，常用的一种机制称为BMBY机制。该机制运行方式如下：每位所有者可通过报价启动BMBY程序。一旦所有者公布价格，另一方需选择以该价格出售其持有份额或购买启动者的股份。该机制简单易行，但未能揭示所有者的真实估值，无法保证有效配置，且更关键的是其仅适用于双人合伙场景。本文将此逻辑拓展至多人所有者场景。我们提出的机制能够真实揭示所有者估值，且具备多项理想特性：易于实施、预算平衡、抗合谋（弱群组防策略性）、个体理性以及事后有效。