In this paper, we introduce ACE, a consent-embedded searchable encryption scheme. ACE enables dynamic consent management by supporting the physical deletion of associated data at the time of consent revocation. This ensures instant real deletion of data, aligning with privacy regulations and preserving individuals' rights. We evaluate ACE in the context of genomic databases, demonstrating its ability to perform the addition and deletion of genomic records and related information based on ID, which especially complies with the requirements of deleting information of a particular data owner. To formally prove that ACE is secure under non-adaptive attacks, we present two new definitions of forward and backward privacy. We also define a new hard problem, which we call D-ACE, that facilitates the proof of our theorem (we formally prove its hardness by a security reduction from DDH to D-ACE). We finally present implementation results to evaluate the performance of ACE.

翻译：本文提出ACE，一种嵌入同意的可搜索加密方案。ACE通过支持在撤销同意时物理删除关联数据，实现动态同意管理。这确保数据的即时真实删除，符合隐私法规并保障个人权利。我们在基因组数据库场景中评估ACE，证明其能基于ID执行基因组记录及相关信息的添加与删除，尤其满足删除特定数据所有者信息的要求。为正式证明ACE在非自适应攻击下的安全性，我们提出前向隐私和后向隐私两个新定义，并定义了一个名为D-ACE的新困难问题（通过从DDH到D-ACE的安全归约形式化证明其困难性），该问题有助于定理的证明。最后，我们给出实现结果以评估ACE的性能。