We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria (NE) exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers

翻译：我们提出了项目提交博弈的框架，用以刻画参与式预算（及多赢家选举）中项目提案者的行为模式。在此框架中，每个提案者提交一个项目提案子集，其目标是使获得资助的项目总成本最大化。我们重点关注在何种条件下博弈存在纯纳什均衡（NE），以及验证其存在性的计算复杂度问题。同时，我们致力于为提案者设计计算最优响应的算法。