This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection during synthesis, accounting for both security and timing impact, and (2), at runtime, randomly switching the operation between these cells. This approach serves to significantly obscure static power patterns, which are at the heart of static PSCAs. Our experimental results on a commercial 28nm node show a drastic increase in the effort required for a successful attack, namely up to 96 times more traces. When compared to prior countermeasures, ours incurs little cost, making it a lightweight defense.

翻译：本文提出了一种新型防御策略，旨在对抗静态功耗侧信道攻击（PSCA）——这一对密码安全构成重大威胁的攻击方式。该方法基于以下两个核心环节：（1）在综合阶段精细调控高阈值电压与低阈值电压单元的选择，同时兼顾安全性与时序影响；（2）在运行时随机切换这些单元的工作状态。该策略能够显著掩盖构成静态PSCA根基的静态功耗模式。我们在商用28纳米工艺节点上的实验结果表明，攻击者成功破解所需的工作量急剧增加——追踪次数最多提升至96倍。与现有防御方案相比，本方法成本极低，是一种轻量级防护手段。