In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but only through a worst-case lens. Instead, we study the expected distortion of voting rules with respect to an underlying distribution over voter utilities. Our main contribution is the design and analysis of a novel and intuitive rule, binomial voting, which provides strong distribution-independent guarantees for both expected distortion and expected welfare.

翻译：在计算社会选择中，投票规则的扭曲度衡量该规则克服有限偏好信息以选取社会理想结果的程度。这一概念虽已被广泛研究，但始终局限于最坏情景视角。我们转而基于选民效用的潜在分布考察投票规则的期望扭曲度。本文的核心贡献在于设计并分析了一种新颖直观的规则——二项投票，该规则在期望扭曲度和期望社会福利两方面均提供了与分布无关的强有力保障。