Service Level Agreement (SLA) monitoring in service-oriented environments suffers from inherent trust conflicts when providers self-report metrics, creating incentives to underreport violations. We introduce a framework for generating verifiable SLA violation claims through trusted hardware monitors and zero-knowledge proofs, establishing cryptographic foundations for genuine trustworthiness in service ecosystems. Our approach starts with machine-readable SLA clauses converted into verifiable predicates and monitored within Trusted Execution Environments. These monitors collect timestamped telemetry, organize measurements into Merkle trees, and produce signed attestations. Zero-knowledge proofs aggregate Service-Level Indicators to evaluate compliance, generating cryptographic proofs verifiable by stakeholders, arbitrators, or insurers in disputes, without accessing underlying data. This ensures three security properties: integrity, authenticity, and validity. Our prototype demonstrates linear scaling up to over 1 million events per hour for measurements with near constant-time proof generation and verification for single violation claims, enabling trustless SLA enforcement through cryptographic guarantees for automated compliance verification in service monitoring.

翻译：在面向服务的环境中，服务水平协议监控存在固有的信任冲突，当服务提供商自行报告指标时，会激励其少报违规行为。我们引入一个框架，通过可信硬件监控器和零知识证明生成可验证的SLA违规声明，为服务生态系统中的真正可信性建立密码学基础。我们的方法从将机器可读的SLA条款转换为可验证谓词开始，并在可信执行环境中进行监控。这些监控器收集带时间戳的遥测数据，将测量结果组织成Merkle树，并生成签名证明。零知识证明聚合服务水平指标以评估合规性，生成可由利益相关方、仲裁员或保险人在争议中验证的密码学证明，而无需访问底层数据。这确保了三个安全属性：完整性、真实性和有效性。我们的原型展示了每小时处理超过100万个事件的线性扩展能力，对于单次违规声明的证明生成和验证时间接近常数，从而通过密码学保证实现无需信任的SLA执行，支持服务监控中的自动化合规验证。