This paper presents the economic impacts of spot instance service on the cloud service providers (CSPs) and the customers when the CSPs offer it along with the on-demand instance service to the customers. We model the interaction between CSPs and customers as a non-cooperative two-stage dynamic game. Our equilibrium analysis reveals (i) the techno-economic interrelationship between the customers' heterogeneity, resource availability, and CSPs' pricing policy, and (ii) the impacts of the customers' service selection (spot vs. on-demand) and the CSPs' pricing decision on the CSPs' market share and revenue, as well as the customers' utility. The key technical challenges lie in, first, how we capture the strategic interactions between CSPs and customers, and second, how we consider the various practical aspects of cloud services, such as heterogeneity of customers' willingness to pay for the quality of service (QoS) and the fluctuating resource availability. The main contribution of this paper is to provide CSPs and customers with a better understanding of the economic impact caused by a certain price policy for the spot service when the equilibrium price, which from our two-stage dynamic game analysis, is able to set as the baseline price for their spot service.

翻译：本文研究了云服务提供商(CSPs)在向客户提供按需实例服务的同时，额外提供竞价实例服务所产生的经济影响。我们将云服务提供商与客户之间的互动建模为非合作的两阶段动态博弈。均衡分析揭示了：(i) 客户异质性、资源可用性与云服务提供商定价策略之间的技术经济关联性；(ii) 客户服务选择（竞价型与按需型）及云服务提供商定价决策对云服务提供商市场份额、收入以及客户效用的影响。关键技术挑战在于：首先，如何捕捉云服务提供商与客户之间的策略互动；其次，如何考虑云服务的各类实际因素，如客户对服务质量(QoS)支付意愿的异质性以及资源可用性的波动性。本文的主要贡献在于：通过两阶段动态博弈分析得出的均衡价格可作为竞价服务的基准价格，从而帮助云服务提供商和客户更深入地理解特定竞价服务定价策略引发的经济影响。