A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working increases the arrival rate of breakthroughs and decreases the arrival rate of breakdowns. To motivate the agent to work, the principal conducts costly inspections. She fires the agent if shirking is detected. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection policy. Periodic inspections are optimal if work primarily generates breakthroughs. Random inspections are optimal if work primarily prevents breakdowns. Crucially, the agent's actions determine his risk attitude over the timing of punishments.

翻译：一位委托人雇佣代理人从事一项长期项目，该项目以突破或失败告终。每个时刻，代理人私下选择工作或偷懒。工作会提高突破的发生率并降低失败的发生率。为了激励代理人工作，委托人进行成本高昂的检查。若发现偷懒，则解雇代理人。我们刻画了委托人的最优检查策略。若工作主要促成突破，则定期检查为最优；若工作主要防止失败，则随机检查为最优。关键在于，代理人的行为决定了他对惩罚时机风险态度的取向。