The liberalisation of the European passenger railway markets through the European Directive EU 91/440/EEC states a new scenario where different Railway Undertakings compete with each other in a bidding process for time slots. The infrastructure resources are provided by the Infrastructure Manager, who analyses and assesses the bids received, allocating the resources to each Railway Undertaking. Time slot allocation is a fact that drastically influences the market equilibrium. In this paper, we address the time slot allocation problem within the context of a liberalized passenger railway market as a multi-objective model. The Infrastructure Manager is tasked with selecting a point from the Pareto front as the solution to the time slot allocation problem. We propose two criteria for making this selection: the first one allocates time slots to each company according to a set of priorities, while the second one introduces a criterion of fairness in the treatment of companies to incentive competition. The assessment of the impact of these rules on market equilibrium has been conducted on a liberalized high-speed corridor within the Spanish railway network.

翻译：欧洲客运铁路市场通过欧盟指令91/440/EEC实现自由化，开创了不同铁路公司在时隙投标过程中相互竞争的新格局。基础设施资源由基础设施管理者提供，其负责分析评估收到的投标，并将资源分配给各铁路公司。时隙分配是深刻影响市场均衡的关键因素。本文在自由化客运铁路市场背景下，将时隙分配问题构建为多目标模型。基础设施管理者的任务是从帕累托前沿中选择一个点作为时隙分配问题的解。我们提出两种选择准则：第一种根据优先级集合向各公司分配时隙，第二种引入公平对待企业的准则以激励竞争。基于西班牙铁路网络内一条自由化高速铁路走廊，我们评估了这些规则对市场均衡的影响。