Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a significant incentive on blockchain networks, referring to the value captured through the manipulation of transaction execution order and strategic issuance of profit-generation transactions. We argue that transaction ordering techniques used for MEV extraction in blockchains where fees can influence the execution order do not directly apply to blockchains where the order is determined based on transactions' arrival times. Such blockchains' First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) nature can yield different optimization strategies for entities seeking MEV, known as searchers, requiring further study. This paper explores the applicability of MEV extraction techniques observed on Ethereum, a fee-based blockchain, to Algorand, an FCFS blockchain. Our results show the prevalence of arbitrage MEV getting extracted through backruns on pending transactions in the network, uniformly distributed to block positions. However, on-chain data do not reveal latency optimizations between specific MEV searchers and Algorand block proposers. We also study network clogging attacks and argue how searchers can exploit them as a viable ordering technique for MEV extraction in FCFS networks.

翻译：最大可提取价值（MEV）已成为区块链网络中的一项重要激励机制，特指通过操纵交易执行顺序及策略性发布盈利交易而获取的价值。我们认为，在费用影响执行顺序的区块链中，用于MEV提取的交易排序技术并不直接适用于基于交易到达时间确定顺序的区块链。此类区块链的"先到先服务"（FCFS）特性会催生针对MEV寻求者（即搜索者）的不同优化策略，亟需进一步研究。本文探讨了基于费用的以太坊区块链中MEV提取技术在FCFS区块链Algorand上的适用性。研究结果表明，网络中通过待处理交易的尾随攻击进行套利型MEV提取的现象普遍存在，且均匀分布于区块位置。但链上数据并未揭示特定MEV搜索者与Algorand区块提议者之间的延迟优化。我们同时研究了网络堵塞攻击，并论证了在FCFS网络中，搜索者如何将其作为可行的排序技术以提取MEV。