Philosophical research in AI has hitherto largely focused on the ethics of AI. In this paper we, an ethicist of belief and a machine learning scientist, suggest that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI - the epistemology of AI, and in particular an ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief, a field that has been defined in various ways, to refer to a sub-field within epistemology. This subfield is concerned with the study of possible moral, practical, and other non-alethic dimensions of belief. And in this paper, we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what agents - both human and artificial - ought to believe, rather than with descriptive questions concerning whether certain beliefs meet various evaluative standards such as being true, being justified or warranted, constituting knowledge, and so on. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI; morally owed beliefs; pragmatic and moral encroachment on AI beliefs; and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven't yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI.

翻译：迄今为止，人工智能领域的哲学研究主要聚焦于AI伦理。在本文中，我们——一位信念伦理学家与一位机器学习科学家——提出需要开拓AI哲学研究的新领域：AI认识论，特别是AI的信念伦理。此处我们将"信念伦理"（这一概念有多种界定方式）定义为认识论的一个子领域。该子领域关注信念可能存在的道德、实践及其他非真理维度。本文主要探讨信念伦理中的规范性问题——即行动者（包括人类与人工智能）应当相信什么，而非描述性问题——即特定信念是否满足真理性、确证性、正当性等评价标准。我们提出人类信念伦理现有研究中的四个可适用于AI信念伦理的议题：AI的道义性错误信念；道德上应然的信念；实用与道德因素对AI信念的侵扰；以及AI信念的道德责任。同时指出两个尚未被普遍承认为AI信念伦理研究、但因其探索信念的道德与实践维度而实际属于该领域的相对新兴哲学研究方向：AI的认识伦理去殖民化；以及AI中的认识不公正。