This study explores the intricacies of waiting games, a novel dynamic that emerged with Ethereum's transition to a Proof-of-Stake (PoS)-based block proposer selection protocol. Within this PoS framework, validators acquire a distinct monopoly position during their assigned slots, given that block proposal rights are set deterministically, contrasting with Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocols. Consequently, validators have the power to delay block proposals, stepping outside the honest validator specs, optimizing potential returns through MEV payments. Nonetheless, this strategic behaviour introduces the risk of orphaning if attestors fail to observe and vote on the block timely. Our quantitative analysis of this waiting phenomenon and its associated risks reveals an opportunity for enhanced MEV extraction, exceeding standard protocol rewards, and providing sufficient incentives for validators to play the game. Notably, our findings indicate that delayed proposals do not always result in orphaning and orphaned blocks are not consistently proposed later than non-orphaned ones. To further examine consensus stability under varying network conditions, we adopt an agent-based simulation model tailored for PoS-Ethereum, illustrating that consensus disruption will not be observed unless significant delay strategies are adopted. Ultimately, this research offers valuable insights into the advent of waiting games on Ethereum, providing a comprehensive understanding of trade-offs and potential profits for validators within the blockchain ecosystem.

翻译：本研究探讨了等待博弈的复杂性，这是一种随着以太坊转向基于权益证明（PoS）的区块提议者选择协议而出现的新型动态。在这种PoS框架下，验证者在其指定时段内获得了独特的垄断地位，因为区块提议权是确定性设定的，这与工作量证明（PoW）协议形成对比。因此，验证者有能力延迟区块提议，偏离诚实验证者规范，通过MEV支付优化潜在回报。然而，这种行为引入了区块成为孤块的风险——如果证明者未能及时观察并投票支持该区块。我们对这一等待现象及其相关风险的量化分析表明，存在超出标准协议奖励的增强MEV提取机会，为验证者参与该博弈提供了充足的激励。值得注意的是，我们的发现表明，延迟提议并不总是导致孤块，而孤块也并非始终比非孤块提议得更晚。为进一步检验不同网络条件下的共识稳定性，我们采用了一个专为PoS以太坊定制的基于智能体的仿真模型，说明除非采用显著的延迟策略，否则不会观察到共识扰动。最终，本研究为以太坊上等待博弈的出现提供了宝贵见解，全面理解了区块链生态系统中验证者面临的权衡与潜在利润。