We propose a belief-formation model where agents attempt to discriminate between two theories, and where the asymmetry in strength between confirming and disconfirming evidence tilts beliefs in favor of theories that generate strong (and possibly rare) confirming evidence and weak (and frequent) disconfirming evidence. In our model, limitations on information processing provide incentives to censor weak evidence, with the consequence that for some discrimination problems, evidence may become mostly one-sided, independently of the true underlying theory. Sophisticated agents who know the characteristics of the censored data-generating process are not lured by this accumulation of ``evidence'', but less sophisticated ones end up with biased beliefs.

翻译：我们提出了一种信念形成模型，在该模型中，主体试图区分两种理论，而确证性证据与反证性证据在强度上的不对称性，使得信念倾向于支持那些能产生强烈（且可能罕见）确证性证据与微弱（且频繁）反证性证据的理论。在我们的模型中，信息处理能力的局限性激励主体审查薄弱证据，其后果是，对于某些区分性问题，无论真实理论如何，证据可能变得几乎一边倒。了解审查数据生成过程特征的成熟主体不会为这种“证据”的积累所迷惑，但不够成熟的主体最终会形成偏颇的信念。