Honeypots play a crucial role in implementing various cyber deception techniques as they possess the capability to divert attackers away from valuable assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers' preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that generates optimal honeypot allocation strategies within an attack/defense scenario. Our proposed approach takes into consideration the changes in network connectivity. In particular, we introduce a two-player dynamic game model that explicitly incorporates the future state evolution resulting from changes in network connectivity. The defender's objective is twofold: to maximize the likelihood of the attacker hitting a honeypot and to minimize the cost associated with deception and reconfiguration due to changes in network topology. We present an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibrium strategies and analyze the scalability of the algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach and present numerical results based on simulations, demonstrating that our game model successfully enhances network security. Additionally, we have proposed additional enhancements to improve the scalability of the proposed approach.

翻译：蜜罐因其能够将攻击者从有价值资产上转移开的能力，在实施各种网络欺骗技术中发挥着关键作用。网络中蜜罐的战略性放置不仅要考虑网络因素，还需考量攻击者的偏好。在网络移动性条件下战术网络中蜜罐的分配问题具有重要研究价值。为实现此目标，我们提出一种博弈论方法，可在攻防场景中生成最优蜜罐分配策略。该方法充分考虑了网络连通性的变化。具体而言，我们构建了一个双人动态博弈模型，该模型显式纳入了由网络连通性变化引起的未来状态演化。防御者的目标具有双重性：最大化攻击者落入蜜罐的概率，同时最小化因网络拓扑变化而产生的欺骗与重构成本。我们提出了一种迭代算法来寻找纳什均衡策略，并分析了该算法的可扩展性。最后，通过仿真实验验证了所提方法，数值结果表明我们的博弈模型有效增强了网络安全。此外，我们还提出了额外改进措施以提升所提方法的可扩展性。