We study the role of information and access in capacity-constrained selection problems with fairness concerns. We develop a statistical discrimination framework, where each applicant has multiple features and is potentially strategic. The model formalizes the trade-off between the (potentially positive) informational role of a feature and its (negative) exclusionary nature when members of different social groups have unequal access to this feature. Our framework finds a natural application to policy debates on dropping standardized testing in admissions. Our primary takeaway is that the decision to drop a feature (such as test scores) cannot be made without the joint context of the information provided by other features and how the requirement affects the applicant pool composition. Dropping a feature may exacerbate disparities by decreasing the amount of information available for each applicant, especially those from non-traditional backgrounds. However, in the presence of access barriers to a feature, the interaction between the informational environment and the effect of access barriers on the applicant pool size becomes highly complex. Furthermore, we consider an extension with two schools and costly tests, where strategic students decide whether to take the test or not. Our theoretical results reveal that the students' test-taking behavior can be non-monotonic. We characterize the two-school policy equilibria and show that each school's optimal decision to drop the test critically depends on the other school's test policy. Finally, using calibrated simulations, we demonstrate the presence of practical instances where the decision to eliminate standardized testing improves or worsens all metrics.

翻译：我们研究具有公平考量的能力约束型选拔问题中信息与可及性的作用。我们构建了一个统计歧视框架，其中每位申请者具备多个特征，且可能采取策略性行为。该模型形式化了特征（潜在的正面）信息作用与其（负面的）排斥性质之间的权衡——当不同社会群体成员对该特征的可及性不均等时。该框架自然适用于关于取消招生标准化考试的政策辩论。我们的主要结论是：是否取消某个特征（如考试成绩）,不能脱离其他特征提供的信息语境以及该要求对申请者群体构成的影响单独决定。取消某个特征可能因减少每位申请者（尤其来自非传统背景者）可获得的信息量而加剧不平等。然而,当特征存在可及性壁垒时,信息环境与可及性壁垒对申请者群体规模的影响之间会产生高度复杂的交互作用。此外,我们考虑了两个学校与有偿考试的拓展情形——策略性学生自主决定是否参加考试。理论结果表明,学生的参考行为可能呈现非单调性。我们刻画了两校政策均衡,并揭示每所学校取消考试的最优决策关键取决于另一所学校的考试政策。最后,通过校准模拟,我们证实了在某些实际情境中,取消标准化考试可能改善或恶化所有指标。