Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocation satisfies desirable stability and proportional fairness properties. We consider a model where agents have separable linear utility functions over the public goods, and the output assigns to each good an amount of spending, summing to at most the available budget. In the uncapped setting, each of the public goods can absorb any amount of funding. In this case, Lindahl equilibrium is known to be equivalent to maximizing Nash social welfare, and can be computed by a public-goods variant of the proportional response dynamics. We introduce a new convex programming formulation for computing this solution and show that it is related to Nash welfare maximization through double duality and reformulation. We then show that the proportional response dynamics is equivalent to running mirror descent on our new formulation. Our new formulation has similarities to Shmyrev's convex program for Fisher markets. In the capped setting, each public good has an upper bound on the amount of funding it can receive, which is a type of constraint that appears in fractional committee selection and participatory budgeting. In this setting, existence of Lindahl equilibrium was only known via fixed-point arguments. The existence of an efficient algorithm computing one has been a long-standing open question. We prove that our new convex program continues to work when the cap constraints are added, and its optimal solutions are Lindahl equilibria. Thus, we establish that approximate Lindahl equilibrium can be efficiently computed in the capped setting to any desired accuracy. Our result also implies that approximately core-stable allocations can be computed for the class of separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities.

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