The rapid proliferation of satellite constellations, particularly in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), has fundamentally altered the global space infrastructure, shifting the risk landscape from purely kinetic collisions to complex cyber-physical threats. While traditional safety frameworks focus on debris mitigation, ground-based adversaries increasingly exploit radio-frequency links, supply chain vulnerabilities, and software update pathways to degrade space assets. This paper presents a comparative analysis of satellite cybersecurity across LEO, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) regimes. By synthesizing data from 60 publicly documented security incidents with key vulnerability proxies--including Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) anomalies, encryption weaknesses, and environmental stressors--we characterize how orbital altitude dictates attack feasibility and impact. Our evaluation reveals distinct threat profiles: GEO systems are predominantly targeted via high-frequency uplink exposure, whereas LEO constellations face unique risks stemming from limited power budgets, hardware constraints, and susceptibility to thermal and radiation-induced faults. We further bridge the gap between security and sustainability, arguing that unmitigated cyber vulnerabilities accelerate hardware obsolescence and debris accumulation, undermining efforts toward carbon-neutral space operations. The results demonstrate that weak encryption and command path irregularities are the most consistent predictors of adversarial success across all orbits.

翻译：卫星星座的快速扩张，特别是低地球轨道（LEO）星座，已从根本上改变了全球空间基础设施，将风险格局从单纯的动能碰撞转向复杂的网络物理威胁。传统的安全框架侧重于碎片减缓，而地基对手正日益利用射频链路、供应链漏洞和软件更新途径来削弱空间资产。本文对低地球轨道（LEO）、中地球轨道（MEO）和地球静止轨道（GEO）三种轨道的卫星网络安全进行了比较分析。通过综合60起公开记录的安全事件数据以及关键脆弱性代理指标——包括遥测、跟踪与指令（TT&C）异常、加密弱点和环境压力因素——我们刻画了轨道高度如何决定攻击可行性和影响。我们的评估揭示了不同的威胁特征：GEO系统主要通过高频上行链路暴露成为主要目标，而LEO星座则面临因有限功率预算、硬件约束以及对热和辐射诱发故障的敏感性而产生的独特风险。我们进一步弥合了安全与可持续性之间的鸿沟，认为未缓解的网络漏洞会加速硬件过时和碎片积累，从而破坏实现碳中和空间运行的努力。结果表明，弱加密和指令路径异常是所有轨道上对手成功最一致的预测因素。