Both Schulze and ranked pairs are voting rules that satisfy many natural, desirable axioms. Many standard types of electoral control (with a chair seeking to change the outcome of an election by interfering with the election structure) have already been studied. However, for control by replacing candidates or voters and for (exact) multimode control that combines multiple standard attacks, many questions remain open. We solve a number of these open cases for Schulze and ranked pairs. In addition, we fix a flaw in the reduction of Menton and Singh [IJCAI 2013] showing that Schulze is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates and re-establish a vulnerability result for destructive control by deleting candidates. In some of our proofs, we study variants of s-t vertex cuts in graphs that are related to our control problems.

翻译：Schulze与排序对（ranked pairs）是满足诸多自然且优良公理的投票规则。已有研究探讨了标准类型的选举控制问题（即主持人通过干扰选举结构改变选举结果）。然而，在通过替换候选人或选民实施控制，以及结合多种标准攻击的（精确）多模式控制方面，仍有诸多问题尚未解决。本文针对Schulze与排序对规则解决了其中若干未决情形。此外，我们修正了Menton和Singh [IJCAI 2013] 证明Schulze规则对通过删除候选人进行建设性控制具有抵抗性时存在的归约缺陷，并重新确立了其对此类破坏性控制的脆弱性结论。部分证明中，我们研究了与控制问题相关的图论中s-t顶点割的变体形式。