The distribution of efficient individuals in the economy and the efforts that they will put in if they are hired, there are two important concerns for a technologically advanced firm. wants to open a new branch. The firm does not have information about the exact level of efficiency of an individual when she is hired. We call this situation incomplete information. The standard principal agent models assume that employees know their efficiency levels. Hence these models design incentive-compatible mechanisms. An incentive-compatible mechanism ensures that a participant does not have the incentive to misreport her efficiency level. This paper does not assume that employees know how efficient they are. This paper assumes that the production technology of the firm is intelligent, that is, the output of the machine reveals the efficiency levels of employees. Employees marginal contributions to the total output of the intelligent machine, the probability distribution of the levels of efficiency and employees costs of efforts together define a game of incomplete information. A characterization of ex-ante Nash Equilibrium is established. The results of the characterization formalize the relationship between the distribution of efficiency levels and the distribution of output.

翻译：经济中高效个体的分布以及受雇时其投入的努力程度，是技术先进企业开设新分支机构时面临的两个重要考量。企业在雇佣个体时缺乏关于其确切效率水平的信息，我们将此情形称为不完全信息。标准委托代理模型假定员工知晓自身的效率水平，因此这些模型设计激励相容机制。激励相容机制确保参与者没有动机谎报其效率水平。本文并不假定员工了解自身效率高低，而是假定企业的生产技术具有智能性，即机器产出能揭示员工的效率水平。员工对智能机器总产出的边际贡献、效率水平的概率分布以及员工努力成本共同定义了一个不完全信息博弈。本文建立了事前纳什均衡的表征，该表征结果形式化了效率水平分布与产出分布之间的关系。