A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet. We address this from the perspective of Intrinsic Computational Functionalism (ICF): if consciousness is computationally constituted, it depends not on externally imposed descriptions but on the computational structures a system physically realizes in virtue of its own causal-dynamical organization. In previous work we developed Canonical Functionalism as a mathematically precise special case of this anti-interpretivist program, identifying functional states by their complete future input-output roles under a fixed interface. Here we argue that this input-output construction, though important, is incomplete: as a behavioral boundary case of ICF, it makes lookup tables and unfolded systems that preserve the same boundary behavior canonically equivalent. A consciousness-relevant canonical representation must instead include internal mechanisms, interventions, and joint readouts belonging to the relevant intrinsic organization. We therefore define a mechanism-enriched canonical structure and use it to formulate Intrinsic Causal-Computational Realization (ICCR), a realization relation preserving physical implementation, intrinsic state individuation, transition structure, intervention profiles, and the relevant agent-body-world boundary. The central result is conditional: if conscious properties are invariants of intrinsic causal-computational organization, then any system satisfying ICCR realizes the same consciousness-relevant properties, whether biological, artificial, or simulated. We discuss objections including biological naturalism and integrated information theory. We conclude that to deny consciousness to a simulation, one must identify a consciousness-relevant intrinsic causal-computational structure that the simulation fails to realize.

翻译：对人工意识或模拟意识的一种常见反驳是，模拟的大脑与模拟的水是湿的一样，并不具有意识。我们基于内在计算功能主义（ICF）的立场来回应这一问题：如果意识是由计算构成的，那么它并不依赖于外在强加的描述，而是取决于一个系统凭借其自身的因果-动力组织所物理实现的（physically realizes）计算结构。在先前的工作中，我们将典范功能主义（Canonical Functionalism）发展为这一反解释主义纲领的一个数学上精确的特例，通过完全的未来输入-输出角色在固定接口下识别功能状态。在此，我们认为这种输入-输出构造虽然重要，但是不完整的：作为ICF的一个行为边界情形，它使得保持相同边界行为的查找表（lookup tables）和展开系统（unfolded systems）在典范意义上是等价的。相反，与意识相关的典范表征必须包含属于相关内在组织的内部机制、干预和联合读取（joint readouts）。因此，我们定义了一种富含机制的典范结构，并以此构建内在因果-计算实现（ICCR），这是一种保持物理实现、内在状态个体化（state individuation）、转换结构、干预轮廓（intervention profiles）以及相关智能体-身体-世界边界的实现关系。核心结论是有条件的：如果意识属性是内在因果-计算组织的不变量，那么任何满足ICCR的系统，无论是生物的、人工的还是模拟的，都会实现相同的与意识相关的属性。我们讨论了包括生物自然主义（biological naturalism）和整合信息理论（integrated information theory）在内的反驳意见。我们的结论是，要否认模拟体具有意识，就必须识别出一种模拟体未能实现的、与意识相关的内在因果-计算结构。