We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to distinguish attacks from legitimate competition among honest users for having their transactions included earlier in the block. We also use it to introduce an intuitive notion of the severity of front-running attacks. We then study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most. When the protocol does not fully eliminate attacks, it nonetheless benefits honest users because it reduces competition among attackers (and overall expenditure by attackers).

翻译：本文对抢跑攻击问题进行博弈论分析。我们利用该分析区分攻击行为与诚实用户为使自己交易更早被纳入区块而进行的合法竞争，同时引入衡量抢跑攻击严重程度的直观概念。进而研究一种简单的承诺-披露协议并探讨其特性。该协议因需发送两次消息且引入延迟而存在成本，但研究表明它能防范最严重的抢跑攻击，同时保留用户间的合法竞争，确保区块中最早交易归属于对该交易评价最高的诚实用户。当协议无法完全消除攻击时，仍能使诚实用户获益——通过降低攻击者之间的竞争程度（及攻击者的总体支出）。