Large language models have achieved remarkable capabilities across diverse domains, yet their safety alignment remains vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. In this work, we identify a previously underexplored failure mode - safety generalization lag - where alignment trained predominantly on natural language fails to transfer to the code domain. We show that this lag induces a code-completion blind spot, allowing malicious intent embedded within syntactically valid code to evade safety mechanisms. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CodeMimicry, a fully automated black-box jailbreak framework that generates structured, object-oriented code prompts to induce harmful outputs via code completion. Experiments on 8 state-of-the-art commercial LLMs demonstrate that CodeMimicry achieves a 96.25% attack success rate with 1.51 queries on average, significantly outperforming both template-based and optimization-based baselines. Beyond empirical performance, we provide a mechanistic analysis of code-based jailbreaks through latent space representations, including projection onto refusal-related directions and activation steering. This analysis offers an explanation of how CodeMimicry bypasses safety mechanisms in code-related domains. Our findings reveal a weakness in current safety alignment and highlight the need for robust alignments in structured domains such as code.

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