Agents in mixed-motive coordination problems such as Chicken may fail to coordinate on a Pareto-efficient outcome. Safe Pareto improvements (SPIs) were originally proposed to mitigate miscoordination in cases where players lack probabilistic beliefs as to how their delegates will play a game; delegates are instructed to behave so as to guarantee a Pareto improvement on how they would play by default. More generally, SPIs may be defined as transformations of strategy profiles such that all players are necessarily better off under the transformed profile. In this work, we investigate the extent to which SPIs can reduce downsides of miscoordination between expected utility-maximizing agents. We consider games in which players submit computer programs that can condition their decisions on each other's code, and use this property to construct SPIs using programs capable of renegotiation. We first show that under mild conditions on players' beliefs, each player always prefers to use renegotiation. Next, we show that under similar assumptions, each player always prefers to be willing to renegotiate at least to the point at which they receive the lowest payoff they can attain in any efficient outcome. Thus subjectively optimal play guarantees players at least these payoffs, without the need for coordination on specific Pareto improvements. Lastly, we prove that renegotiation does not guarantee players any improvements on this bound.

翻译：在混合动机协调问题（如斗鸡博弈）中，智能体可能无法就帕累托有效结果达成协调。安全帕累托改进（SPIs）最初被提出用于缓解当参与者缺乏关于其代理人如何博弈概率信念时的协调失败问题；代理人被指示采取行为以保障对其默认博弈方式的帕累托改进。更一般地，SPIs可定义为策略配置的变换，使得所有参与者在变换后的配置下必然获益。本文研究SPIs在多大程度上能够减少期望效用最大化型智能体之间协调不足的负面影响。我们考虑参与者提交计算机程序的博弈，这些程序能够根据彼此代码决定自身决策，并利用这一性质通过具备重新谈判能力的程序构建SPIs。我们首先证明，在参与者信念的温和条件下，每个参与者总是倾向于使用重新谈判。随后表明，在类似假设下，每个参与者至少愿意重新谈判至其所能获得的最低效结果收益点。因此，主观最优博弈可保障参与者至少获得这些收益，而无需协调特定帕累托改进。最后，我们证明重新谈判并不能保证参与者在该边界上获得任何改进。