We present an autonomous cryptanalysis workflow in which agents generate, test, and refine hypotheses before human review. The autonomous stage returns reproducible candidates with exact witnesses, controls, code, and run records. A researcher then decides whether the evidence establishes a break, defect, or coverage gap. Two failure modes recur. First, a public algebraic map or input representation erases or exposes a relation that a construction must hide. Examples include multiplication by zero, boundary coefficients of a polynomial product, quotients, characters, Schur squares, and variable-length byte encodings without boundaries. Second, a simulator, error law, or parameter certification uses a distribution different from the one claimed. Several targets fail in both ways. Every result has an exact witness and a discriminating control; every stated boundary has a proof. Three further targets yielded no attack but support narrower guarantees than a generic reading suggests. Eight published constructions fail at stated parameters or claims. A Ring-LWR commitment opens to every message with probability one. One ciphertext reveals two middle-product encryption rows. A lattice e-voting protocol loses receipt-freeness. A permutation-recovery attack against updatable encryption extends by linear algebra to the old decryption key. An explicit normal basis splits a degree-63 instance into seven degree-nine instances. A signature hash outside the lattice setting maps two printable equal-length messages to the same digest. A rerandomisable scheme's accept bit is a threshold oracle on its decryption noise. Separately, a group-ring decision claim and a multivariate MinRank hardening fail at the assumption or accounting level rather than as complete construction breaks. Each failure occurs one level above its supporting assumption.

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