We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit-maximizing mechanisms with verification. As the verification technology varies, the solution continuously interpolates between the no-verification solution and full surplus extraction.

翻译：我们在机制设计中引入一种概率验证模型。委托人从代理人处获取信息，随后选择一项测试对代理人进行考察。代理人的真实类型决定其能够通过每项测试的概率。我们刻画了每种类型是否存在一项能最有效筛选所有其他类型的相关测试。若该条件成立，则测试技术可用易于处理的简化形式表示。我们利用这种简化形式求解带有验证机制的利润最大化方案。随着验证技术的变化，该方案在无验证情形与完全剩余抽取之间连续插值。