Satellite user terminals are a promising target for adversaries seeking to target satellite communication networks. Despite this, many protections commonly found in terrestrial routers are not present in some user terminals. As a case study we audit the attack surface presented by the Starlink router's admin interface, using fuzzing to uncover a denial of service attack on the Starlink user terminal. We explore the attack's impact, particularly in the cases of drive-by attackers, and attackers that are able to maintain a continuous presence on the network. Finally, we discuss wider implications, looking at lessons learned in terrestrial router security, and how to properly implement them in this new context.

翻译：卫星用户终端是攻击者针对卫星通信网络的一个极具吸引力的目标。尽管如此，常见于地面路由器的许多防护措施在某些用户终端中并未配备。我们以星链路由器管理界面为案例，通过模糊测试发现了一种针对星链用户终端的拒绝服务攻击。我们探讨了该攻击的影响，特别是针对路过式攻击者以及能够长期保持网络连接的攻击者。最后，本文讨论了更广泛的影响，借鉴了地面路由器安全领域的经验教训，并探讨如何在此新场景中正确实施这些防护措施。