Researchers increasingly explore deploying brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) for able-bodied users, with the motivation of accessing mental states more directly than allowed by existing body-mediated interaction. This motivation seems to contradict the long-standing HCI emphasis on embodiment, namely the general claim that the body is crucial for cognition. This paper addresses this apparent contradiction through a review of insights from embodied cognition and interaction. We first critically examine the recent interest in BCIs and identify the extent cognition in the brain is integrated with the wider body as a central concern for research. We then define the implications of an integrated view of cognition for interface design and evaluation. A counterintuitive conclusion we draw is that embodiment per se should not imply a preference for body movements over brain signals. Yet it can nevertheless guide research by 1) providing body-grounded explanations for BCI performance, 2) proposing evaluation considerations that are neglected in modular views of cognition, and 3) through the direct transfer of its design insights to BCIs. We finally reflect on HCI's understanding of embodiment and identify the neural dimension of embodiment as hitherto overlooked.

翻译：研究者日益探索将脑机接口（BCI）部署于健全用户，其动机在于比现有身体中介交互更直接地获取心理状态。这一动机似乎与长久以来人机交互（HCI）对具身性的强调相矛盾——即身体对认知至关重要的普遍主张。本文通过回顾具身认知与交互的洞见来解决这一表面矛盾。我们首先批判性地审视近期对BCI的兴趣，将大脑认知与更广泛身体整合的程度确定为研究的核心关切。随后，我们界定认知整合观对界面设计与评估的启示。我们得出的反直觉结论是：具身性本身不应暗示对肢体运动优先于脑信号的偏好。然而，它仍可通过以下方式指导研究：1）为BCI性能提供基于身体的解释；2）提出模块化认知观所忽视的评估考量；3）将其设计洞见直接迁移至BCI。最后，我们反思HCI对具身性的理解，并指出具身性的神经维度迄今被忽视。