AI assistants increasingly work as teams, where one model makes a plan, others search the web, use tools, or read stored information, and another writes the final answer. This creates new security risks because harmful instructions can enter through information passed between models, not just through the user's message. Yet safety tests usually report only whether an attack succeeded, without showing what actually stopped it. We show that systems with similar safety scores can depend on very different protections. Across five agent models, attacks were stopped by a cloud provider's filter, by the model itself, or by inconsistent model behavior. This matters because protection that comes from the model or provider may disappear when either one changes. We introduce CHANNELGUARD, an application-controlled defense that checks information at each handoff without extra training or additional model calls. Across more than 5,700 test runs, it stopped all tested attacks hidden in tool outputs on all five models. On two open models, it reduced successful prompt attacks from 80% to 3% and from 77% to 10%, with no change in accuracy on 30 math problems. However, reworded attacks could still bypass the defense.

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