Wi-Fi deauthentication attacks remain a practical denial-of-service (DoS) threat by exploiting unprotected management frames to disrupt client connectivity. In this work, we introduce a software-defined testbed to measure Wi-Fi resilience to deauthentication attacks. We experimentally evaluate five wireless security configurations: open networks, WPA1, WPA2 without Protected Management Frames (PMF), WPA2 with PMF, and WPA3. Using controlled experiments, we measure client disconnection rates, packet injection volume, and time-to-disruption under each configuration. Packet-level behavior is analyzed using standard wireless auditing tools. Open networks, WPA1, and WPA2 without PMF proved entirely vulnerable to deauthentication, while no successful attacks were observed for WPA2 with PMF or WPA3 under tested conditions. These findings confirm the effectiveness of management-frame protection and highlight the continued risk posed by legacy or misconfigured wireless deployments.

翻译：Wi-Fi去认证攻击通过利用未受保护的管理帧来破坏客户端连接，仍然是一种实际的拒绝服务（DoS）威胁。在本工作中，我们引入了一种软件定义的测试平台，用于测量Wi-Fi对去认证攻击的韧性。我们通过实验评估了五种无线安全配置：开放网络、WPA1、不带保护管理帧（PMF）的WPA2、带PMF的WPA2以及WPA3。通过受控实验，我们测量了每种配置下的客户端断开率、数据包注入量以及中断时间。使用标准无线审计工具分析了数据包级行为。开放网络、WPA1以及不带PMF的WPA2被证明完全易受去认证攻击，而在测试条件下，未观察到针对带PMF的WPA2或WPA3的成功攻击。这些发现证实了管理帧保护的有效性，并突显了遗留或配置错误的无线部署所带来的持续风险。