We study ways of evaluating the performance of losing projects in participatory budgeting (PB) elections by seeking actions that would have led to their victory. We focus on lowering the projects' costs, obtaining additional approvals for them, and asking supporters to refrain from approving other projects: The larger a change is needed, the less successful is the given project. We seek efficient algorithms for computing our measures and we analyze and compare them experimentally. We focus on the greedyAV, Phragm\'en, and Equal-Shares PB rules.

翻译：我们研究在参与式预算选举中评估落选项目绩效的方法，通过寻找本可使其胜选的行动路径。具体关注三种干预措施：降低项目成本、获取更多支持票数、以及请求支持者放弃对其他项目的投票。所需干预幅度越大，表明项目表现越不理想。我们寻求能高效计算这些评估指标的算法，并通过实验分析与比较不同方案。研究聚焦于greedyAV、Phragmén和Equal-Shares三种参与式预算规则。