As advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) propel progress in the life sciences, they may also enable the weaponisation and misuse of biological agents. This article differentiates two classes of AI tools that could pose such biosecurity risks: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). LLMs, such as GPT-4 and its successors, might provide dual-use information and thus remove some barriers encountered by historical biological weapons efforts. As LLMs are turned into multi-modal lab assistants and autonomous science tools, this will increase their ability to support non-experts in performing laboratory work. Thus, LLMs may in particular lower barriers to biological misuse. In contrast, BDTs will expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors. Concretely, BDTs may enable the creation of pandemic pathogens substantially worse than anything seen to date and could enable forms of more predictable and targeted biological weapons. In combination, the convergence of LLMs and BDTs could raise the ceiling of harm from biological agents and could make them broadly accessible. A range of interventions would help to manage risks. Independent pre-release evaluations could help understand the capabilities of models and the effectiveness of safeguards. Options for differentiated access to such tools should be carefully weighed with the benefits of openly releasing systems. Lastly, essential for mitigating risks will be universal and enhanced screening of gene synthesis products.

翻译：随着人工智能（AI）的进步推动生命科学的发展，也可能导致生物制剂的武器化与滥用。本文区分了两类可能构成此类生物安全风险的AI工具：大型语言模型（LLMs）与生物设计工具（BDTs）。LLMs（如GPT-4及其后继版本）可能提供双重用途信息，从而消除历史生物武器开发过程中遇到的部分障碍。当LLMs转化为多模态实验室助手和自主科学工具时，其支持非专业人员完成实验室工作的能力将增强。因此，LLMs可能尤其会降低生物滥用的门槛。相比之下，BDTs将扩展高技能行为者的能力范围。具体而言，BDTs或可制造出远超现有认知的流行性病原体，并可能催生更具可预测性和针对性的生物武器形式。LLMs与BDTs的融合协同，既可能提升生物制剂的危害上限，也可能使其广泛可及。一系列干预措施将有助于管控风险：独立预发布评估可帮助理解模型能力与防护措施有效性；需谨慎权衡此类工具差异化访问权限与开放系统发布带来的收益；最后，对基因合成产品实施普适性强化筛选将是缓解风险的关键。