Broken access control, the failure of authorization, is one of the most prevalent web security risks. Unlike injection, a flow of untrusted input into a dangerous operation, authorization is a relation: who may act on what, not how data moves. Each application decides that relation for itself, so no rule written in advance carries to the next. An LLM agent can infer it from the code, but with no systematic way to cover the application and prioritize what to inspect, its search stays undirected and access-control flaws go undetected. We present ABSENTIA, a security scaffolding that turns general LLM agents into systematic vulnerability detectors for the backend of web applications, run as an audit by the developers and security engineers who maintain the code. Under its direction, the agents build a graph that maps the application's routes to the code behind them. ABSENTIA then works route by route, applying invariant falsification: it infers the properties the code is meant to satisfy, and where one is not enforced, reports the route for maintainer review. We also release BAC-Bench, a benchmark of 30 broken access control advisories across 25 repositories, 3 languages, and 9 frameworks, each published in 2025 or later, verified by a human auditor, and paired with its fixing commit, so credit requires flagging the vulnerable version and not the fixed one. ABSENTIA recalls 19 of them, 17 under paired credit, and an LLM verifier confirms 51% of its findings. CodeQL and Semgrep recall none, and an unstructured agent on the same model recalls 3. In the OWASP Benchmark injection categories, ABSENTIA leads the dedicated analyzers in Python and trails only CodeQL and IRIS in Java.

翻译：暂无翻译