We analyse the 2025 Signalgate leak of sensitive US military information by the Trump administration, addressing why confidentiality was violated (messages leaked to the press) in spite of encryption (Signal), to deepen the socio-technical considerations when designing and deploying encryption. First, we use applied pi-calculus to formally model the boutique secure facility setup requested by the US Defence Secretary, to prove that a leak would not be prevented. We then examine how using a secure channel might still not give overall information security, as, in this case, power imbalances between personnel and officials led to the application of cryptography that compromised their operational security. We look at how cryptographic tools may have instilled a false sense of security, and led officials to "overshare". We then apply this analysis to the Trump administration's general desire to burn through political, legal, and now technical process, and demonstrate geopolitical harms that may arise from such ineffective use of cryptography in a brief use case. We conclude that, even with advancements in usability of cryptographic tools, genuine message security is still out of reach of the "average user".

翻译：我们分析了2025年特朗普政府泄露敏感美军信息的“Signal门”事件，探讨为何在使用了加密通信工具（Signal）的情况下，保密性仍被破坏（消息泄露给媒体），旨在深化设计和部署加密技术时的社会技术考量。首先，我们运用应用π-演算正式建模了美国国防部长要求的精品安全设施配置，证明该配置无法阻止泄露。接着，我们检验了使用安全信道为何仍不能保证整体信息安全——在此案例中，人员与官员之间的权力失衡导致加密技术的应用反而损害了其操作安全。我们审视了加密工具如何可能催生一种虚假的安全感，并致使官员“过度分享”。随后，我们将这一分析应用于特朗普政府普遍存在的、试图绕过政治、法律乃至技术流程的倾向，并通过一个简短的用例，论证了此类无效加密可能引发的地缘政治危害。我们得出结论：即便加密工具的易用性有所提升，真正的消息安全对“普通用户”而言仍然遥不可及。