The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive information, such as secret keys, from the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Existing countermeasures against power-based side channel attacks focus on analyzing information leakage at the byte level. However, this approach neglects the impact of individual bits on the overall resistance of a cryptographic implementation. In this work, we present a countermeasure based on single-bit leakage. The results suggest that the proposed countermeasure cannot be broken by attacks using conventional SCA leakage models.

翻译：CMOS电路的功耗对处理数据的依赖性是一个已知的漏洞，会导致侧信道的产生，这些信道可被基于功耗的侧信道攻击（SCA）所利用。此类攻击能够从密码算法的实现中提取敏感信息，例如密钥。现有的针对功耗侧信道攻击的防护措施主要集中于分析字节级别的信息泄露。然而，这种方法忽略了单个比特对密码实现整体抗攻击能力的影响。在本工作中，我们提出了一种基于单比特泄露的防护措施。结果表明，使用传统SCA泄露模型的攻击无法破解所提出的防护措施。