A growing number of central authorities use assignment mechanisms to allocate students to schools in a way that reflects student preferences and school priorities. However, most real-world mechanisms give students an incentive to be strategic and misreport their preferences. In this paper, we provide an identification approach for causal effects of school assignment on future outcomes that accounts for strategic misreporting. Misreporting may invalidate existing point-identification approaches, and we derive sharp bounds for causal effects that are robust to strategic behavior. Our approach applies to any mechanism as long as there exist placement scores and cutoffs that characterize that mechanism's allocation rule. We use data from a deferred acceptance mechanism that assigns students to more than 1,000 university-major combinations in Chile. Students behave strategically because the mechanism in Chile constrains the number of majors that students submit in their preferences to eight options. Our methodology takes that into account and partially identifies the effect of changes in school assignment on various graduation outcomes.

翻译：越来越多的中央当局使用分配机制将学生分配到学校，以反映学生偏好和学校优先级。然而，大多数现实世界中的机制会激励学生采取策略性行为并虚报其偏好。在本文中，我们提出了一种识别方法，用于估计学校分配对未来结果的因果效应，同时考虑策略性虚报行为。虚报可能使现有的点识别方法失效，我们推导出对策略性行为稳健的因果效应的尖锐边界。我们的方法适用于任何存在入学分数和分数线来刻画该机制分配规则的机制。我们使用智利一个延迟接受机制的数据，该机制将学生分配到超过1000个大学-专业组合。由于智利的机制将学生提交的偏好中的专业数量限制为八个选项，学生表现出策略性行为。我们的方法考虑了这一点，并部分识别了学校分配变化对各种毕业结果的影响。