When we interact with large language models (LLMs), are we having a conversation? They are designed to invite us to treat them as intelligent interlocutors who remember, act, and make commitments. But appearances deceive. We introduce the artifactual stance, a framework that reconceives human-AI interaction as artifact-mediated exchanges of candidate texts. LLM outputs are candidate texts optimized for utility, not utterances bearing meaning or force. LLMs are sophisticated text generators, not speakers. Between sessions, nothing runs; between turns, no one remembers. What persists is a configuration and a transcript. The "conversation" is a user's solo performance, interpretive labour disguised by interface and artifact design. This shift dissolves recent philosophical puzzles. Questions about what 'I' and 'you' refer to in AI exchanges, about whether systems can lie or be held to promises, about the identity of our supposed interlocutors all rest on a false presupposition. There is no speaker behind the screen, hence no one to refer to, no one to hold responsible. What feels like dialogue with someone is interaction with an artifact that generates text at unprecedented scale and fit. By abandoning the conversational framing, we see these systems for what they are: immensely sophisticated artifacts that afford varied uses. The philosophical questions that matter are about the normative underpinnings of design, adoption, authorization, and human practices of use.

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