Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models, while insightful, often fail to model the unpredictability and constraints of real-world threat assessment scenarios. We refine sabotage games to reflect the realistic limitations of the saboteur and the network operator. By transforming sabotage games into reachability problems, our approach allows applying existing computational solutions to model realistic restrictions on attackers and defenders within the game. Modifying sabotage games into dynamic network security problems successfully captures the nuanced interplay of strategy and uncertainty in dynamic network security. Theoretically, we extend sabotage games to model network security contexts and thoroughly explore if the additional restrictions raise their computational complexity, often the bottleneck of game theory in practical contexts. Practically, this research sets the stage for actionable insights for developing robust defense mechanisms by understanding what risks to mitigate in dynamically changing networks under threat.

翻译：保护动态网络免受敌对行为的影响具有挑战性，因为需要预测并应对复杂网络结构中敌对实体造成的策略性破坏。传统博弈论模型虽有洞察力，但往往无法模拟现实世界威胁评估场景中的不可预测性和约束条件。我们改进破坏游戏以反映破坏者和网络运营者的实际限制。通过将破坏游戏转化为可达性问题，我们的方法能够利用现有的计算解决方案来模拟游戏中攻击者和防御者的真实限制。将破坏游戏转化为动态网络安全问题，成功捕捉了动态网络安全中策略与不确定性的微妙交互。理论上，我们扩展了破坏游戏以建模网络安全情境，并深入探讨了额外限制是否提升了其计算复杂度——这通常是博弈论在实际应用中的瓶颈。实践上，本研究通过理解在受威胁的动态变化网络中需缓解哪些风险，为开发稳健防御机制提供了可操作的见解。